WASHINGTON — President Obama has warned Russia that “there will be costs” for a military intervention in Ukraine.
But the United States has few palatable options for imposing such
costs, and recent history has shown that when it considers its interests
at stake, Russia has been willing to pay the price.
Even
before President Vladimir V. Putin on Saturday publicly declared his
intent to send Russian troops into the Ukrainian territory of Crimea,
Mr. Obama and his team were already discussing how to respond. They
talked about canceling the president’s trip to a summit meeting in
Russia in June, shelving a possible trade agreement, kicking Moscow out
of the Group of 8 or moving American warships to the region.
That
is the same menu of actions that was offered to President George W.
Bush in 2008, when Russia went to war with Georgia, another balky former
Soviet republic. Yet the costs imposed at that time proved only
marginally effective and short-lived. Russia stopped its advance but
nearly six years later has never fully lived up to the terms of the
cease-fire it signed. And whatever penalty it paid at the time evidently
has not deterred it from again muscling a neighbor.
“The
question is: Are those costs big enough to cause Russia not to take
advantage of the situation in the Crimea? That’s the $64,000 question,”
said Brig. Gen. Kevin Ryan, a retired Army officer who served as defense
attaché in the American Embassy in Moscow and now, as a Harvard
scholar, leads a group of former Russian and American officials in
back-channel talks.
Mr.
Obama announced the first direct response after a 90-minute telephone
call with Mr. Putin on Saturday as he suspended preparations for the G-8
summit meeting in Russia in June. The White House said that “Russia’s
continued violation of international law will lead to greater political
and economic isolation.”
Michael
McFaul, who just stepped down as Mr. Obama’s ambassador to Moscow, said
the president should go further to ensure that Russia’s business-minded
establishment understands that it would find itself cut off. “There
needs to be a serious discussion as soon as possible about economic
sanctions so they realize there will be costs,” he said. “They should
know there will be consequences and those should be spelled out before
they take further actions.”
Mr.
Putin has already demonstrated that the cost to Moscow’s international
reputation would not stop him. Having just hosted the Winter Olympics in
Sochi, he must have realized he was all but throwing away seven years
and $50 billion of effort to polish Russia’s image. He evidently
calculated that any diplomatic damage did not outweigh what he sees as a
threat to Russia’s historic interest in Ukraine, which was ruled by
Moscow until the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Mr.
Putin may stop short of outright annexation of Crimea, the largely
Russian-speaking peninsula where Moscow still has a major military base,
but instead justify a long-term troop presence by saying the troops are
there to defend the local population from the new pro-Western
government in Kiev. Following a tested Russian playbook, he could create
a de facto enclave loyal to Moscow much like the republics of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia that broke away from Georgia. On the other hand,
the White House worries that the crisis could escalate and that all of
Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine may try to split off.
Finding
powerful levers to influence Mr. Putin’s decision-making will be a
challenge for Mr. Obama and the European allies. Mr. Obama has seen
repeatedly that warnings often do not discourage autocratic rulers from
taking violent action, as when Syria crossed the president’s “red line”
by using chemical weapons in its civil war.
Russia
is an even tougher country to pressure, too formidable even in the
post-Soviet age to rattle with stern lectures or shows of military
force, and too rich in resources to squeeze economically in the short
term. With a veto on the United Nations Security Council, it need not
worry about the world body. And as the primary source of natural gas to
much of Europe, it holds a trump card over many American allies.
The
longer-term options might be more painful, but they require trade-offs
as well. The administration could impose the same sort of banking
sanctions that have choked Iran’s economy. And yet Europe, with its more
substantial economic ties, could be reluctant to go along, and Mr.
Obama may be leery of pulling the trigger on such a potent financial
weapon, especially when he needs Russian cooperation on Syria and Iran.
“What
can we do?” asked Fiona Hill, a Brookings Institution scholar who was
the government’s top intelligence officer on Russia during the Georgia
war when Mr. Putin deflected Western agitation. “We’ll talk about
sanctions. We’ll talk about red lines. We’ll basically drive ourselves
into a frenzy. And he’ll stand back and just watch it. He just knows
that none of the rest of us want a war.”
James
F. Jeffrey was Mr. Bush’s deputy national security adviser in August
2008, the first to inform him that Russian troops were moving into
Georgia in response to what the Kremlin called Georgian aggression
against South Ossetia. As it happened, the clash also took place at
Olympic time; Mr. Bush and Mr. Putin were both in Beijing for the Summer
Games.
Mr.
Bush confronted Mr. Putin to no avail, then ordered American ships to
the region and provided a military transport to return home Georgian
troops on duty in Iraq. He sent humanitarian aid on a military aircraft,
assuming that Russia would be loath to attack the capital of Tbilisi
with American military personnel present. Mr. Bush also suspended a
pending civilian nuclear agreement, and NATO suspended military
contacts.
“We did a lot but in the end there was not that much that you could do,” Mr. Jeffrey recalled.
Inside
the Bush administration, there was discussion of more robust action,
like bombing the Roki Tunnel to block Russian troops or providing
Georgia with Stinger antiaircraft missiles. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice bristled at what she called the “chest beating,” and
the national security adviser, Stephen J. Hadley, urged the president to
poll his team to see if anyone recommended sending American troops.
None
did, and Mr. Bush was not willing to risk escalation. While Russia
stopped short of moving into Tbilisi, it secured the effective
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, while leaving troops in
areas it was supposed to evacuate under a cease-fire. Within a year or
so, Russia’s isolation was over. Mr. Obama took office and tried to
improve relations. NATO resumed military contacts in 2009, and the
United States revived the civilian nuclear agreement in 2010.
Mr.
Jeffrey, now at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said Mr.
Obama should now respond assertively by suggesting that NATO deploy
forces to the Polish-Ukrainian border to draw a line. “There’s nothing
we can do to save Ukraine at this point,” he said. “All we can do is
save the alliance.”
Others
like Mr. Ryan warn that military movements could backfire by misleading
Ukrainians into thinking the West might come to their rescue and so
inadvertently encourage them to be more provocative with Russia.
Ms. Hill said the Russian leader might simply wait. “Time,” she said, “is on his side.”
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